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INTRODUCTION
Week after week, in the summer of 1997, we waited for the dire news about the
impending crisis in rural Egypt. October is the month for annually modifying
contract arrangements concerning rents, tenancy, and land usufruct. This particular
October was to witness the climax of a five-year grace period during which time
farm land prices and rents gradually rose to their free-market value. It was to
culminate in the government's "unreform" program. This scheme gave new
unrestricted rights to land owners but critically limited the personal economies of
those who rents had been artificially lowered by a long string of laws appearing
since the famous 1952 land reform program under Gamal `Abd al-Nassir. But in the
months leading up to October, throughout that crucial summer, the newspapers
merely reported a flare-up here, an outburst there, a demonstration in this or that
village. Surprisingly, October came and went with only a whimper, not a bang. The
revolution that was suppose to start in the Egyptian countryside had fizzled out. The
orthodox left explained the non-event by pointing to false "peasant" consciousness.
Others blamed the heavy hand of government repression for crushing potential
unrest. Still others saw the anemic weakness of Egyptian democracy and its
eviscerated political party system as unable to mobilize effective opposition (El
Tantawi 1999).
In fact, the matter was that farmers were simply not interested any more.
Indeed, Law 96, which codified all these new economic relations, was merely one
more nail in the coffin of Egyptian agriculture. It continued a long line of legislation
and state policies that not only reduced the ability of Egypt's countryside to produce
adequate amounts of food and export crops, but more important severely limited its
capacity to generate adequate living standards and promising futures for its
residents. Farmers were no longer interested because over the last 30 years they had
shifted away from relying solely on agriculture and into diversifying income
sources. Many have left farming altogether, registered statistically as a substantial
drop in the proportion of the agricultural work force from 57 percent in 1960 to 31
percent in 1996 (Department of Statistics and Census 1963; CAPMAS 1999).
 This paper was presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting,
Florence, March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, European University Institute.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Asef Bayat and Elisabeth Longuenesse for
their hard work in organizing the workshop in which this chapter was first delivered. Many
thanks, also, to the panelists for their helpful comments and insights to the paper.
4Starting with the import substitution policies of `Abd al- Nassir, followed by
the open door policy of Anwar al-Sadat and concluding with the structural
adjustments under Husni Mubarak, this long line of government policies, then, has
contributed to wave after wave of rural to urban migration.
The purpose of the present paper, then, is to understand what this migration
of rural workers has meant to Egypt's economic growth. In particular, it discusses
the impact that such relocation has had on urban employment, both informal and
formal, and its effect on workers to organize successfully in protecting their rights
and benefits.
In the 1960s the flood of workers out of the countryside did not automatically
mean their transfer to urban areas, fortunate since the cities were ill-prepared to
provide jobs for such an onslaught. Instead, migrants found employment in building
the High Dam in Aswan and reclaiming the desert in Tahrir Province (Toth
1999:227-228). However, with the High Dam completed in 1964 and land
reclamation mired down in corruption and inefficiency, workers began viewing
urban employment as the next reasonable step to relieving their poverty and
providing a sustainable future. Held back by the seven lean years 1967- 1974 when
Egypt's economy remained paralyzed by the war of attrition against Israel
(Waterbury 1983:112), they afterward inundated Cairo, Alexandria, the Canal Zone
cities, and provincial capitals and towns to find jobs that were, simply by definition,
forever better than those back in the village. Replacing workers who emigrated
abroad in response to the oil boom and then later emigrating themselves, they
emptied the Egyptian countryside (relatively speaking) and inadvertently created an
urban surplus labor army that wreaked havoc with Egypt's labor markets. Urban
Egypt was still unprepared for such substantial employment, and so workers
squirmed and squeezed their way into informal sector activities, involuted in the
ways that Clifford Geertz once depicted for Indonesian agriculture (1963), but now
located in urban interstices.
And despite scholarly pronouncements of a dual economy and segmented
labor market that presumably erected an impervious barrier preventing those in the
informal sector from accessing jobs in the formal economy, workers themselves
frequently traversed the permeable boundary that separated the two. This gave rise
to an uneasy and unstable employment situation for those in the formal sector, and
a rivalry and scramble to those in micro-enterprises who threatened to take their
jobs.
5Enter the unions. In principle, such labor organizations limit the size of a
particular labor force sector so as to keep wages high, and negotiate with
management so as to secure benefits and demarcate obligations for both sides. But
in Egypt, labor unions are undermined from the start by this "threat" from the
informal sector. Companies then cavalierly dismiss these organizations as they fight
viciously for every piaster in Egypt's version of brutal Yankee capitalism. In so
many examples in capitalist societies, labor radicalism has appeared only in
legalizing unions. But once accepted, unions become tame, docile labor-control
mechanisms, and radicals go elsewhere, onto other crusades. Companies in Egypt,
however, have chosen to oppose unions and to forfeit such control in favor of
diluting their formal work force with aspirants from the informal sector, a training
ground for those who are later used to weaken labor's organizational might.
RURAL OUT-MIGRATION
Long before Law 96 emerged from Parliament in 1992, Egypt's countryside had
encountered earlier policies that had squeezed agriculture of capital, crops, and
contadinos. As early as 1957 Egypt had begun to nationalize foreign and domestic
companies in a bid to jump-start its stagnant economy. By 1960 it was clear that the
private sector would not cooperate in government plans for sustainable growth. On
July 23, 1961, President `Abd al-Nassir dramatically announced a startling array of
nationalizations, sequestrations, and confiscations. Hand in hand with this
industrialization policy came controls over agricultural property, commerce, and
prices that jeopardized the livelihoods and authority of landlords up and down the
Nile valley. The government, discontented with the meager results of the 1952 land
reform law that had netted only 3.6 percent of land and distributed it to merely 5
percent of rural producers, announced further estate expropriations, halved the
ceiling on land ownership, and limited owner compensation (Toth 1999:104-105,
adapted from Abdel Fadil 1975: 9, 125). In addition, the state either started or
advanced four other policies - Aswan High Dam construction, land reclamation,
farm price controls, and agricultural cooperatives - that guaranteed problems would
appear in agriculture that would have a lasting impact on national development
(Toth 1999:Chapter 5).
Two of these programs involved infrastructural mega-projects that had first
emerged shortly after the Free Officers assumed power in 1952. But due to
international intrigues, diplomatic difficulties, and the Suez War, High Dam
construction remained moribund until 1960. Meanwhile, the land reclamation
program became embroiled in charges of corruption and mismanagement which
suspended operations until the same year, 1960. Once restarted, both called for vast
numbers of unskilled workers recruited primarily from the Egyptian countryside.
6Then, a year later when the government announced its nationalization of rural
properties, it also announced a program in agricultural price controls and
para-statals. With the subsequent restrictions on income and power, farm employers
were in no position to stop the massive exodus of rural workers and small tenants
moving south to Aswan or north to make the desert bloom.
The government was intent on providing cheap food for low-paid urban
consumers and cheap capital to finance its thirst for industrial growth. But the price
controls and para-statal monopolies that provided these inexpensive commodities
negatively affected rural incomes and deftly engineered an artificial poverty. With
non-farm wages for the unskilled three to ten times those found in agriculture,
laborers and small farmers left the countryside in droves. The squeeze on the
agricultural terms of trade made farming and farm employment a losing proposition.
Surprisingly, government bureaucrats were unaware of the problems they
were creating. In fact, most middle-class Cairenes who staffed state offices saw the
countryside absolutely teeming with unlimited numbers of surplus workers (Toth
1999:50-54, 160). This withdrawal of labor, they concluded, presented no problem.
Yet I have estimated elsewhere (Ibid, 106-108) that up to 80 percent of rural
Egyptians were in need of the extra income provided by construction and
reclamation projects and their ancillary activities. So as plans proceeded, workers
continued to relocate, and employers remained unable to bring them back home.
Indeed, in 1964, labor unrest on these two national mega- projects threatened
to bring their operations to a halt. In response, the government created a national
labor organization - the General Union of Agriculture and Migrant Workers - that
attracted even larger numbers of farm workers by offering tangible benefits, higher
wages, and social dignity. Begun at a provincial level in 1961, this union was soon
elevated to a national level and became a national cause celebre. Elections in the
summer of 1964, while corrupt, nevertheless held promise that rural workers could
escape the misery and poverty of the countryside in favor of better work conditions
and income in Aswan and in the desert. Even as Egypt suffered a critical recession
in 1965-1966 - its annual growth rate, which had increased since 1960 at a healthy
5 percent, dipped ominously at mid-decade to 0.3 percent - the government
continued to encourage workers to leave the countryside and to find employment
(with the High Dam completed) in land reclamation. The effect on agriculture was
not short of shocking. Bereft of food and export crops, Egypt's balance of payments
suddenly collapsed. Short of foreign currency and imported spare parts, Egypt was
in no position to finance and support the machinery of war. The war of June, 1967,
put an end to Egypt's dreams of being the regional hegemonic power (Toth 1999 :
Chapter 6).
7CONSTRUCTING MORE URBAN JOBS
After the Six-Day war, rural workers were in no less need than before of improving
their income and living standards. But the cities had simply stopped hiring, and
although this never stopped those before or since, the calamity of the war generated
a physical and psychic immobility. Egypt's economic development remained
paralyzed until yet another war unblocked the imagination and sparked another
massive labor movement, this time out of the cities to Libya and the Gulf and then
out of the countryside to replace those urban workers who had left the country.
Yet more significant than any feeble attempt to regain the Sinai, the war of
October 1973 compelled supportive Arab countries to raise oil prices that expanded
these petroleum economies and attracted massive numbers of expatriate workers.
Since 1968, new investment capital had begun financing economic growth
throughout the developing world. Plant and infrastructural construction required
both skilled and unskilled workers even before Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) boosted its prices to record levels. High rates of emigration for
construction workers had already appeared two years earlier in 1971 (Choucri, et al.
1978: 63). For many had grown disenchanted with Egypt's retrenchment such that
the flow of skilled workers began reaching impressive proportions even before
petroleum price hikes triggered a far greater exodus.
Thus the 1973 price increases that were sparked by, and in support of, Egypt's
October war, greatly accelerated labor emigration. By 1976, as much as 60 percent
of Egypt's labor force in the construction sector was employed abroad. In 1978 this
proportion may have risen to as high as 80 percent (Hansen and Radwan 1982:89;
Choucri 1980:83). "There is little doubt," two veteran economists concluded, "that
emigration is now dominated by construction workers, unskilled workers, and
farmers, and represents a much broader sample of the Egyptian labour force"
(Hansen and Radwan 1982:89). This sector displayed such a voracious appetite for
manual workers that subsequent domestic vacancies were promptly filled by
workers moving out of agriculture employment. Workers no longer tolerated the
dismal conditions of farm work. Instead they wanted permanent, full-time, high
wage, contractual jobs in the city. A large proportion of these rural-to-urban
migrants found jobs in urban construction.
But this enormous drain of labor from the countryside was not merely an
automatic response to the freely operating forces of regional supply and demand
impersonally operating across international borders. Instead it was the outcome of
a deliberate government policy that, however, was not formulated in a disinterested
8fashion, but was one that was finally adopted under intense pressure from numerous
workers demanding higher incomes and a better standard of living. Egypt's
emigration policy turned out to be the result of increased labor agitation coming
primarily from skilled workers in the construction trades.
Initially, the government, under pressure from construction companies,
responded by prohibiting all skilled craftsmen from leaving the country. In July
1974, just nine months after OPEC raised its prices, the government announced
travel restrictions for all craft trades (al-Ahram July 7, 1974). The Housing and
Labor Ministries ordered travel bans and decreed that all workers must carry identity
cards and legal documents clearly stamped with their occupation and travel
authorization. Passports, visas, military and security clearance documents became
obstacles used to prevent emigration (Dessouki 1978:22).
Workers did not accept such restrictions calmly. They bribed government
officials to overlook identity card stamps; paid others to have their card altered, and
many gave false occupations when renewing "lost" cards. Once their status was
"revised" to a more harmless category, craft workers left Egypt in unprecedented
numbers, traveled abroad, and sought and accepted foreign employment.
Challenged by the unauthorized departure of such large numbers of workers,
the government finally capitulated in the fall of 1974 and abandoned its adamant
opposition. As Parliament demanded changes in ministerial regulations, the only
viable option left was to permit open travel. Documenting departures became
simplified and encouraged many who did not actually hold contracts to leave and
find employers once abroad (Messiha 1980:12).
As the Egyptian government saw the fiscal advantages of migration and
remittances, its initial hesitation gave way to support. In 1975, Parliament ratified
a number of formal treaties governing the movement of laborers in Iraq, Libya,
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, not only to protect them against exploitation and bad
working conditions, but also to stop the flow of unregistered workers.
Labor emigration exhibited four distinct phases (Assaad 1991:152). In the
beginning, during the first half of the 1970s, workers went to Libya where overland
travel reduced transportation costs and thus attracted those who were less
prosperous and were not yet so well funded. By the second half of the decade,
workers' remittances began underwriting the more expensive movement to the Gulf.
Emigrants were predominately skilled and urban, but many had earlier moved from
the village to replace their urban counterparts and had acquired enough skills and
connections that they, too, could travel abroad. Then in the early 1980s, the outbreak
9of war between Iraq and Iran raised the demand for unskilled emigrants to replace
those drafted into the Iraqi army. This third phase saw an increase in the flow of
workers moving directly out of the countryside. Until the mid-1980s, the average
duration abroad was 1½ years (Hansen and Radwan 1982:86).
However, in 1985, when world oil prices began to decline, workers' duration
abroad began to fall and fewer workers were actually able to find jobs outside
Egypt. Many returned to Egypt to stay, although they still continued to work in
urban construction. Occasionally, returning expatriates did replace and bump out
their less qualified and less connected colleagues, but a reverse chain reaction did
not send workers back to the countryside to expand the ranks of the agricultural
labor force. Instead, when workers did leave construction, many shifted into
employment in the informal manufacturing, transportation, and service sectors
(Assaad 1991:149-150).
Arriving at accurate numbers for Egyptian emigration is a difficult task. No
single government bureau has maintained adequate records; the actual figures are
scattered throughout a number of offices in Cairo and conflict with each other.
Nevertheless, a number of sources agree on the following figures. From 1968 to
1972, the annual migration rate numbered between 50,00 and 80,000 individuals.
By 1973 this had risen to 157,000. Estimates for 1975 vary from 375,000 to 600,000
to one million. In 1980 anywhere from 500,000 to one million laborers worked
abroad. By 1982, 2 million Egyptians were abroad and by 1985, 3 million (Hansen
and Radwan 1982:86-87; Halliday 1984:8, and al-Ahram. November 3, 1985). The
overall labor force in 1980 was approximately 12 million workers.
Between 1974 and 1978, construction wages increased three- to five-fold and,
in the same years, grew to levels three times higher than those in agriculture
(Hansen and Radwan 1982:74-75). By 1973, there was over 1.5 million unskilled
rural workers in an agricultural labor force of 4 million - half the 1960 number -
who were still in need of better wages and living conditions.
In the 1960s, rural to urban migration to Cairo alone involved over 700,000
people annually. During the next decade, that level rose to over one million. By the
end of the 1980s, the figure had more than doubled to include 1.43 million migrants
(Ibrahim 1996:100). And while these figures do not include those who relocated to
Alexandria, the newly reopened Canal Zone cities, and the provincial capitals and
towns throughout the country, these urban areas expanded rapidly as well. Many
workers used the know-how they had acquired in "on-the-job-training" in their
villages to find similar jobs in urban construction. Not all urban migrants, of course,
were workers, for many farm family members also diversified out of agriculture into
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skilled labor and professional employment. But those looking for urban employment
exceeded the ability of cities to provide full-time, permanent, satisfying work.
Thus as the expanding labor market called for more construction workers,
first for petroleum exporting nations, and then later for their domestic replacements,
local companies increasingly began recruiting those with lesser skills from the ranks
of farm laborers. Because of such rapid turnover, building jobs were eventually
filled by low qualified replacements from the countryside (The General
Organization for Housing, 1981 vol. 2:121). Buildings were poorly constructed,
resulting in the newsworthy collapses of apartment houses reported throughout the
1990s.
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT POLICIES
Yet in the long run, a viable labor market, future job generation, and income growth
in the construction sector critically depended on private and public investments.
This flow of capital in turn heavily depended on effective government financial and
investment policies.
After Egypt's victory in the October 1973 war, the government had
formulated a pro-western open door investment policy that aimed to capitalize on
the new petroleum wealth. Cairo maintained that the combination of Egyptian labor,
Arab capital, and western technology was the solution to the nation's economic ills.
Henceforth Egypt would open its door to new trade, investment, and technology,
reorient its economy away from the barter commerce with the Soviet Union and east
Europe, and align it instead with trade from the United States, western Europe, and
the non-communist community. Such a policy had been under discussion since 1971
but it was the October war that made it not only politically feasible but also
economically imperative. In June 1974, Parliament endorsed the open door policy
by passing Law 43, which made foreign investment more attractive and more
profitable.
This policy encouraged investment by authorizing joint ventures between
foreign capital and local private and public sector firms. Low exchange rates that
had benefitted state transactions became graduated in order to facilitate capital
transfers from abroad. The government legalized private bank operations, foreign
land ownership, lower personal and business taxes, and higher land ownership
ceilings. Although Law 43 did not explicitly call for dismantling the public sector,
it was clear that in time, targeted sectors such as industry, mining, energy, tourism,
transportation, land reclamation, housing, insurance, and banking would be
disassembled and sold to private investors, local or otherwise. The new foreign and
mixed sectors, together with a reinvigorated private sector, would compete with
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what remained of the public sector, resulting in either its greater efficiency or its
bankruptcy (Waterbury 1978:206-223).
Many joint venture projects were proposed and approved, but few were
actually completed. By the end of 1976, only 66 projects valued at £E36 million and
3,450 employees had actually begun operations, although projects totalling 20 times
that capital amount had been approved. Serious entrepreneurs were stymied by
complicated authorization procedures, inadequate review personnel and frequent
staff changes, and the open hostility of public sector officials. This allowed well-
placed expediters to profit from lucrative payoffs and kickbacks paid to facilitate
project approvals. Even President al-Sadat became impatient with the slowness of
the response to Law 43. In June 1977, Parliament modified Law 43 with Law 32 to
make currency transactions, tax abatements, and investments even easier. New
enterprises were also exempted from the existing labor laws. In anticipation, the
state authority accelerated its project review process, approving over 100
applications in just a single day.
By the end of 1978, 134 projects, worth £E440 million were underway,
although this represented only a quarter of the £E1.66 billion initially committed.
Most Law 43 projects were in investment companies, banks, tourism, and luxury
housing. Yet other than banking and hotels, their efforts were not very noticeable.
Few invested in productive enterprises. What the government needed were big joint
ventures in manufacturing with well-known multinational corporations (Waterbury
1978:227-229; 1983:132-133, 142-146). However, these were not forthcoming.
Investment problems continued and industrial development remained static.
The state was unable to draw upon domestic savings since its own banks were not
securing foreign remittances which went instead into the "own-exchange" system
of private importation and currency transactions, and later in private Islamic
investment companies. Currency laws, credit regulations, and import requirements
were revised time and time again so that the national banks could increase their
deposits of remittances and so that the state could access and use this growing
volume of hard currency. Meanwhile, in order to compensate for capital shortages,
state officials relied on short-term commercial credit at very high interest rates
(Waterbury 1978:305; Sadowski 1991:209).
As early as the spring of 1975, the International Monetary Fund, the IMF, had
drafted a stabilization plan to resolve these problems. As part of a larger US Middle
East peace initiative, the plan attracted much attention. But when US diplomatic
efforts faltered, Egypt sought short-term credit from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
12
states instead. Once these oil-producers agreed to ease Egypt's economic plight, the
IMF plan was tabled.
Yet by 1976 Egypt had fallen behind in repaying its short-term debt. Fund-
raising trips to the Gulf were arranged once again, but now even Egypt's Arab
bankers began insisting that Cairo comply with the IMF plan before they would
extend more credit. Their lukewarm promises to contribute emergency aid, finance
additional investments, and extend loans to cover debt servicing failed to provide
sufficient capital. At last, that spring, the government capitulated and agreed to
accept the IMF stabilization plan and its program of fiscal austerity.
The plan included currency devaluations, tax reductions, duty free industrial
zones, more joint ventures, higher land ownership ceilings, budget freezes, and
subsidy reductions. Cairo adamantly rejected devaluing the pound and proposed
instead a two-tier currency system. It initially refused to reduce consumer subsidies,
arguing that it would contribute to rising inflation and to destabilizing the country.
But IMF pressure forced the government to retreat (Waterbury 1978:306-310). In
general, the IMF adjustments benefitted exporters and foreign investors, but left the
vast majority of Egyptian income earners and consumers destitute. Legislative
approval for the plan was postponed until after the parliamentary elections of
October 1976.
The January 1977 Cairo riots, the Camp David peace process, and a
presidential assassination suspended any action on economic reform. Yet financial
difficulties continued to intensify such that by 1987, Egypt was again on the brink
of another major recession. The IMF was the last resort. But the IMF was not the
only source of pressure for reform. Egypt's bilateral and private lenders were also
insisting that Cairo implement the IMF-mandated reform package in order to receive
more credit. The IMF conditions for extended credit and financial assistance insisted
on an Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) that required
reducing budget deficits, reforming banking practices, raising prices, and
eliminating consumer subsidies.
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The IMF package proved extremely inflationary. First it demanded higher
exchange rates which meant devaluing the Egyptian pound. This, the IMF argued,
would improve Egypt's balance of trade, reduce its imports, increase foreign demand
for its exports, and shift capital from the black to the official market. Second, the
IMF insisted that interest rates rise to match or exceed the rate of inflation. This
would enable state banks to attract more deposits and spur investment, but it would
also raise the cost of credit to the government and cause numerous private
bankruptcies. Finally, the IMF urged Egypt to cut its budget deficit by eliminating
costly consumer subsidies and raising government tax revenues. In May 1987, after
the Parliamentary elections, the administration relented, devalued the pound 40
percent, and froze consumer subsidies at their 1986 level. The IMF then agreed to
an 18-month standby agreement that provided new lines of credit and a new
timetable for repaying Egypt's $40 billion foreign debt.
The standard IMF procedure was to offer loans by degrees (tranches),
rewarding progress in implementing reforms or penalizing delays and
noncompliance. Soon IMF officials were complaining that Cairo was reneging on
reducing subsidies, raising commercial exchange rates, and dismantling the public
sector. Egyptian officials replied that already the IMF reforms were triggering social
disorders like those that had erupted in January 1977. Further pressure, they warned,
would result in large-scale riots. To avoid an automatic cut-off of US financial
assistance, Cairo agreed to reduce fuel and food subsidies (Sadowski 1991:35, 215-
219; Springborg 1989:260 and 266). In January 1991, Egypt finally but reluctantly
signed an austere IMF structural adjustments agreement.
The ERSAP package had already made an overall negative impact on the
agricultural economy, even apart from, and before, Law 96 was implemented so as
to raise rents and land prices to free market levels. Granted, crop prices were
liberalized and rose to international free market levels, but so did the cost of inputs.
The price for domestic and imported fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, seed,
equipment, credit, and labor rose faster than the price for cotton, wheat, soybean,
corn, rice, vegetables, and a whole host of other crops. The terms of trade, always
set at a disadvantage for most farmers by the government, now declined even
further. Thus whereas before, the state and its price policies had squeezed the farmer
and created an artificial poverty, now it was the free market that turned the vise to
squeeze him even more. Add on the increases in land rents and the insecurity of
unnotified land sales, and the farmer's situation worsened even more.
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One analyst predicted that this new, free market economy would "eventually
lead to the small holder's disappearance" (Abou-Zeid 1997:25). She further argued
that those few (10 percent) owning five feddans or more might be able to weather
this decline, while those with less (90 percent) could very well sell their holdings
to those who could buy them, and leave the countryside altogether
Already most farmers had long since diversified the income sources of their
households. Diversifying incomes sources is a common mechanism found among
agricultural families that insures that a variety of jobs reduces the risk that any one
occupation by itself might fail to generate sufficient income. Finding employment
in other sectors, however, does depend on its availability, individual abilities,
personal information and connections, and the family development cycle. Yet farm
families continuously compare the emerging skills and pursuits of their members
against the prevailing trends of the outside labor market, and adjust their
consumption and standard of living accordingly. Families may well scrimp and save
in order to elevate a particularly bright teenager into a valuable career (Toth
1999:59).
At no time has such diversification been altogether impossible, although there
were lean years, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, when it was extremely
difficult (Ibid., 103). Yet even before the recent emergence of new jobs in urban
construction, informal enterprises, and services, there were local non-farm activities
in trade, crafts, transport, building, and repair work. However, since 1974, more and
more farm families had given up hope that working in the village could ever be a
viable occupation. With improvements in transportation, many diversified by
migrating or even commuting to urban areas. By 1992, when Law 96 was legislated,
most farm families had members working in other sectors. The vise-grip, then, of
the new "free market" in crops, inputs, rents, and sales and the dismal possibilities
for a viable future in agriculture merely encouraged families to shift more and more
into non-agriculture employment. Increasing numbers found work with informal
construction companies and family firms.
THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR
What was it about the domestic construction sector that attracted so many village
workers? The wide variety of urban construction jobs spanned a continuum from
consecutive casual labor trips, to roving, acephalous teams of independent workers,
to foreman- or contractor-led gangs, to permanently-employed crews moving from
one site to the next for the same employer. This employment established strong
social bonds, higher wages, and congenial work conditions. The high demand for
their labor, the steady employment it initially generated, and the fixed composition
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of work groups made urban construction jobs coveted occupations. Moreover, the
paternalistic form of labor control in small construction operations enabled workers
to keep their position long after the time when building activity and investments
declined.
Since the 1970s, Egypt's construction sector has contained three types of
enterprises:
 a small number of very large public sector companies nationalized after 1961 that
operate in Egypt and throughout the Arab world,
 a larger number of small domestic private firms that operate both independently
and as subcontractors to the larger companies, and
 a much larger number of informal builders and individual subcontractors who
supply local specialty craft and labor-only services.
The relationship between public sector companies, private firms, and independent
subcontractors involves contracts and agreements to supply products and services,
supervision and labor, and finance and credit. Public sector companies clearly
dominate the sector, but are very often too large and unwieldy to be efficient. Their
management involves large administrative bureaucracies which are constrained by
government regulations that reduce their versatility, particularly in the areas of
financial control and manpower staffing.
Subcontracting, however, gives these companies flexibility, which is essential,
if they are to adjust to sharply fluctuating demands. The steady increase in
subcontracting after 1972 shifted the economic burden of this adjustment onto the
shoulders of small private firms and informal businesses. Subcontracting permits
large numbers of workers to be quickly employed and easily dismissed by relying
on less capitalized companies and labor-only subcontractors. Here management
involves a single family or just one man. The same staff is used at the job site as
well as in the home office, so little is spent on administration. Frequently these firms
perform double duty, operating as subcontractors to large public enterprises during
the day, and working independently as main contractors to smaller private jobs in
the afternoon (The General Organization for Housing 1981 vol. 2:120 and vol.
3:G.4-6, 34).
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The proliferation of these smaller firms is the result of monetary ceilings the
government imposed in 1961 that limit the size of subcontracts tendered by public
sector companies in order to reduce favoritism and corruption. But since then, many
private firms have expanded their operations instead by establishing related sister
businesses that specialize in different complementary activities - labor, skilled crafts,
building materials, finance, design. This enables a number of related, but technically
independent firms to win contracts that, were they combined, would exceed the legal
limit (Koch, et al., 1978:5).
Both public and private construction companies rely heavily on labor
subcontractors to provide them with workers despite the presence of their own small
but ordinarily specialized work teams. Such subcontractors specialize in recruiting
and supervising both skilled craft specialists and unskilled manual laborers, and on
occasion provide them with tools and equipment. Although their number is large,
their capital assets are negligible and their monetary contribution to total production
is small, consisting mostly of wages. Even though most business relations in
construction involve formal legal contracts, labor subcontractors usually operate
instead with personal, verbal agreements. Because they mostly work for just one or
a few main contractors, effective business depends on mutual familiarity, trust, and
dependability (The General Organization for Housing 1981 vol. 3:G.18-19).
Specialized laborers are hired at village gathering places, urban coffee shops,
and familiar street intersections. Workers either (1) attach themselves to individual
brokers who contract them out to large companies that switch job sites on a
continuous basis, (2) stay together as independent but acephalous labor teams that
go on to new employers according to prior arrangements, or else (3) if disbanded,
use collegial networks to attach themselves to new brokers or join new labor gangs
(Koch, et al., 1978:42).
In 1987, nearly 65 percent of Egypt's domestic construction work force was
not permanently employed. Ninety percent (both permanent and temporary) lacked
formal contractual arrangements, relying instead on personal patron- client ties to
contractors. Egyptian labor law protects permanent workers from arbitrary dismissal
and entitles them to benefits like retirement pensions. Laborers with permanent or
even temporary contracts are entitled to paid vacations, sick leave, and disability
compensation. But the vast majority of workers are employed by small private firms
that, as part of the informal sector, ignore contract agreements, official registration,
labor and social insurance laws, and tax requirements. This informality allows them
to quickly adjust to rapid changes in demand, wages, locations, and contractors
(Assaad 1991:137). And although it reduces high permanent labor costs for prime
contractors, it also reduces job security and employment stability for workers.
17
While small firms and individual subcontractors depend heavily on public
sector companies for credit, funds, and subsidized building materials, this
relationship is extremely erratic. Many find it difficult to get paid. Bills can be as
much as three years in arrears and are frequently five to six months late. Some firms
carry unpaid government debts for years. Technically public sector companies can
allocate 30 percent of their project funds to advance to subcontractors. But because
of bureaucracy, insufficient budget allocations elsewhere, and cash flow problems,
such funds are seldom passed along. Intermediate payments and final settlements are
frequently delayed as well.
Yet at the same time, subcontractors are required to pay cash for building
materials and advance payments and disbursement of workers' wages. Prices are
determined when agreements are first negotiated, but since labor and materials
procured later usually involve higher costs, subcontractors have to absorb any losses
unless they receive credit. Labor costs are particularly vexing, with huge differences
arising between the original and later wage bills. When prime contractors delay
paying advances and later, in settling intermediate and final charges, subcontractors
have to either borrow or else slow down or even halt work activities. Resuming
work once laborers have left to go home or have gone on to new jobs adds
additional expense to project costs. Retaining an available but inactive work force
can resolve this dilemma and can prevent paying penalty fees, but at the risk of
further depleting scarce capital. Delays in delivering materials often force
contractors into the black market where they pay higher prices in order to ensure
speedier consignment so as to adhere better to fixed completion dates.
This squeeze between immediate payment for labor and materials, and
delayed reimbursement by clients or prime contractors is critical. It makes working
capital and cash flow a major constraint in construction operations. Frequently
subcontractors initiate a large number of contracts simultaneously so that the many
advance payments provide them with enough operating capital to execute just a
single project. Meanwhile, other contracts, although formally begun and partially
paid for, are delayed while other clients settled their accounts. In turn,
subcontractors withhold making payments to their own suppliers and workers when
possible in order to keep their existing operations running (Koch, et al. 1978:38, 46,
51).
Thus contractors are inclined to accept as many jobs as possible in order to
accelerate their cash flow, yet they have little incentive to finish the work underway
since to do so means settling their own outstanding debts. Contracts are therefore
constantly juggled, and actual work proceeds slowly as start-ups and slow-downs
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postpone job completion. This seriously disrupts continuous activity, with work
teams frequently shifted to different sites and alternatively experiencing vigorous
speed-ups and idle unemployment. But it also raises the overall numbers employed
or available in order to have a potential work force that can start or resume work
quickly when financial bottlenecks clear up. Paternalism keeps numerous workers
attached to specific subcontractors when the latter are unwilling to pay wages in
periods of unemployment or are unable to pay them at moments of financial
constriction, but are still able to promise jobs and perquisites to loyal and familiar
workers once operations and cash flows start up again.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this pattern of finance and labor control
generated a momentum that maintained abundant work activity long after actual
investments declined. Construction remained an active employment sector because
it was buoyed up by government plans (1) to build apartments and subsidize the
costs of a financially pressed urban labor force searching for limited (and therefore
expensive) housing, and (2) to erect facilities and infrastructure in preparation for
as yet unrealized promises from international investors to relocate their operations
if such state subsidies were forthcoming. This assured constructions workers that
high levels of employment and wages would continue even as real investment
growth began to decline after 1985.
Multiple start-ups, a myriad of subcontracting agreements with several large
companies, complex credit and cash flow arrangements, and effective patron-client
ties kept the sector very active. Because of this vitality, the inflated size of the work
force, the intermittent nature of construction work, and the paternalistic ties to
employers, laborers who became momentarily unemployed still waited in
anticipation of further work instead of returning to the countryside. But even after
1985, when the construction sector began to slow down, many deactivated workers
found urban jobs in the informal sector or in services, averse to ever going back to
agriculture.
DUEL ECONOMIES
The plethora of large companies and firms, and small subcontracting family
businesses mirrors the dual economy and segmented labor markets analyzed by
Charles Sabel, Michael Piore, and Peter Doeringer (1982, 1984, 1985). In the
Middle East and North Africa [MENA] specifically, Alan Richards and John
Waterbury recently concluded that "most MENA countries experience a kind of
`labor market-dualism,' with two radically different labor- market mechanisms
(1996:140). Such a dual economy consists of two kinds of firms, glossed as stable
and unstable segments within any particular industry. The first type includes big,
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formal operations that produce for a steady consumer market and therefore involve
a constant work force of skilled operators frequently organized into legal labor
unions. The second kind contains small, informal establishments that receive the
unsteady overflow of orders emanating out of the bigger firms, and use a fluctuating
labor force employed in labor-intensive activities. The first type of labor market
hires skilled workers trained on-the-job or in trade schools. The second seeks
unskilled workers who require little, if any, training. Thus the informal sector
appears not only as the serendipitous outcome of massive urban migration and
mismanaged investment shortages, but also as the result of stabilizing formal sector
employment and production in light of erratic consumer markets. It arises, therefore,
not only out of neglect but also out of design. Such schemes use sub-contracting and
out-sourcing to realize this binary relationship.
This dual economy presumes that the labor force is separated and segmented
into "two different worlds" (Sabel 1982:48). Each world, Sabel argues, has a
completely different career path and a totally different social psychology. He notes
that skilled workers are rarely recruited from among the unskilled, although the
reverse happens repeatedly. Under pressure from Taylorization and debasement,
formal labor is often threatened with deskilling. A lucky few are able to escape this
downward trend and reskill, either shifting into maintenance jobs or, reschooled,
adopting new skills. Meanwhile, the unlucky majority, displaced by machines, sinks
further down into the depths of skill-lessness.
However I would argue that important links exist between these two
"segments" in the labor force that parallel the relationship between the stable and
unstable industries, the formal and informal businesses, which they staff. Just as
informal enterprises receive the overflow production from formal companies, so too
does the formal work force receive the labor overflow from the informal sector. That
is, formal companies very frequently do recruit new employees from these small
casual operations, notwithstanding Sabel's remarks to the contrary. Thus regardless
of where the formal work force is in the Taylorization process - and, of course, the
further down, the easier - they can be replaced by bringing in workers from the
informal sector. The total wage bill is substantially reduced by discharging formal
sector workers (and senior veterans in particular) and replacing them with
lower-paid workers recruited from the informal sector. This is particularly
advantageous, from management's point of view, in a raging economy of
privatization, streamlining, and stiff domestic and foreign competition.
In Egypt, this supposedly rigid segregation and segmentation of the urban
labor force is frequently transgressed. Intervening factors such as casual training,
company proximity, personalized labor networks, and paternalism help traverse the
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presumably rigid boundary that separates these two heretofore separated labor
forces.
Much of the replacement of the formal work force by those from the informal
sector depends on training the unskilled. The more advanced the mechanization
process, the fewer are the skills needed when hiring new employees. Daily on-the-
job instruction and previous training in a national work corp may suffice for
employment. In Egypt's own construction sector, skills and training are not so
difficult and unskilled workers can, with some ease, obtain the proficiency needed
to move across the divide. Previous military service often provides what schools
neglect, and many workers relish their time in the army for the vocational training
and the personal networks it provides. Moreover, if workers are recruited for trust
and reliability instead of their know-how and productivity, then the emphasis on
work skills can be reduced even further.
Formal and informal businesses operate together at the same building sites,
and workers live cheek by jowl in the same low-rent neighborhoods.
Communications is facilitated, therefore, and workers easily exchange information
about job opportunities, work conditions, wages, and personalities. At work sites,
intermittent breaks, rest periods, and work stoppage and slowdowns allow space and
time for mingling, conversations, and information-sharing. Outside and off-duty
venues exist as well. Coffeehouse connections prove very important and are much
more salient than any ties established in union halls. These neighborhood leisure
spots are the "men's club" for the poor while the distant "central" union offices
seldom exist, much less support socializing. In Cairo, cafes are skill specific: the
plumbers have their own designated spots; carpenters, too, visit specific coffee
houses; brick layers also frequent known locations, and so on. The unskilled who
wish to find better employment, then, know where to go to strike up conversations
and friendships that can reveal those companies in need of workers. But normally,
the unskilled don't use coffeehouses for employment in their own, unskilled
occupations. Instead, they gather at city squares and particular street intersections
where, in the wee hours of the morning, company recruiters and contractors drive
by looking for familiar faces and unfamiliar new ones to hire for day labor. But
these sites, too, become channels for job information, as workers talk and chat about
all the possibilities they know and can find.
Mosques, too, become important sites where not only workers themselves
congregate, but often include those from lower management, particularly those from
the same informal businesses that employ these workers during the rest of the week.
Mosques are usually neighborhood places, but it is not unknown for men to travel
outside their communities to temporarily visit or permanently attend other
congregations. Although the official purpose, of course, is to pray and worship God,
the mosque is not without its social aspects as well. Arriving early or lingering
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around after prayers are finished, men stand and chat with each other, discussing
work, employment, and new job opportunities. Unlike churches in the West which
are more strictly segregated by denomination and therefore by class, mosques
include members from a number of different strata, united, presumably, by their
common humanity and devotion.
Thus socializing at work, in cafes, and in worship creates and reinforces
collegiality, friendship, and kinship, which prove very important in hiring and
finding new jobs. Since managers employ workers to maximize trust and not skills,
they prefer to hire friends and relatives of those they already know, since this
familiarity guarantees, if not diligence, then at least loyalty, security, and the
protection of property. In volatile economies with uncertain futures and uncertain
markets, maximizing production may not be the most common economic strategy.
Better to keep what one has than to worry needlessly about getting ahead, and thus
a premium is placed on trustworthiness rather than zeal. Currently employed
workers are the first to hear about new job openings, and immediately contact their
network and bring in their colleagues, sponsor their application, and endorse them
to their boss.
Furthermore, these personal relationships are supplemented by the
paternalism that exists between labor and management whereby loyalty and lower
wages are conceded in exchange for dependable employment and trust. Paternalism
is an age-old mechanism of labor control in Egypt, one that long preceded the more
rigid and impersonal bureaucratic style of managing workers that has appeared on
the scene only recently. Paternalism provides a mutuality that benefits both patrons
and clients, although, routinely, the patron gains more while the client gains less.
Patron-managers concede "favors" to their workers, time off, vacation days, and
respite from formal rules and regulations. Client-laborers, on their part, give
"concessions" too: they work harder and longer, support management's authority,
and bring in trustworthy applicants when opportunities arise. Paternalism thus
disguises the unequal and exploitative relationships of production with a patina of
fraternity and equality. It is a familiar relationship based on close personal
understanding between those who are both equals and unequals at the same time. It
is a more mutual, personalized way of doing business.
The solidarity that these personal relations fashion is different from the
situation found among workers in the West. There, individualism and technology
have bred a greater independence, separateness, and isolation that alienate workers
from one another, depersonalize relations with management, and accelerate labor's
efforts to match the demands of a wide-open market. Company bureaucracies create
an impersonal atmosphere based on formal rules and regulations. Seldom do
laborers work with friends, neighbors, and relatives. Nor are there the institutional
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mechanisms like coffeehouses or mosques that reinforce occupational harmony.
Bars and churches do provide some occasion for interaction, yet they seldom bring
both sides together amicably. In place of these personal relations, workers in the
West rely more on impersonal labor unions, government regulations, and job action
against employers to raise low wages, improve bad working conditions, and resolve
disputes. Grievance procedures, arbitration, and government mediation play a much
bigger role than informal companionship. In Egypt, the weak court system, its
labyrinthine legal procedures, and the ineffectual unions preclude the use of formal
channels for resolving most conflicts of interest. Instead, managers and workers
resort to their networks of colleagues, friends, and relatives to settle any
disagreements informally. Thus where such formal institutions hardly exist or, when
they do, operate inefficiently, workers then use their informal and personalized
connections to resolve conflicts, to learn about jobs, and to get ahead.
When workers decide to leave construction altogether, or return from work
outside Egypt (which is mostly in the building trades), many have accumulated the
money and experience to shift elsewhere within the informal sector: small-scale
manufacturing, transportation, and services. But they also carry with them this set
of personalized relations - either horizontal ones with friends, neighbors, and kin,
or vertical ones to paternalistic managers - that enable them to obtain information
and find opportunities for new positions. Notwithstanding the specific skills
required for formal sector employment, which are often easily learned on the job
from the same sponsors who facilitated their employment in the first place, many
workers are eager and eligible for jobs in the formal sector with its higher pay, better
work conditions, contractual obligations, benefits, and security.
This porosity in Egypt's dual economy, then, provides the critical link
between the formal labor force and the surplus labor army of un- and under-
employed workers who flicker in and out of informal sector employment. Workers
discharged from factory positions are quickly replaced by the cohorts of those who
remain. And while starting wages prove a boon to such beginners, they are
frequently at levels lower than those earned by the ex-veterans they replace - an
attractive situation to cost-cutting managers, which may well have inspired the
original firing in the first place. Moreover, loyalty to these personalized relations
supersede the collegiality inside the factory that presumably forms the basis for
labor unions. The organizational capacity of unions to restrict the number of
potential hiring that allows such organizations to regulate wage levels is severely
restricted as external allegiances override internal solidarity. Unions are gutted from
within, a self-defeating practice that makes them unable to turn around and protect
workers' rights, privileges, and wages from managerial assault.
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LABOR UNIONS
One function of labor unions and similar organizations is to stabilize the numerical
size of a particular skilled work force so that wages can be maintained at levels
satisfactory to workers. This, of course, assumes a "closed shop" such that
employers can only hire from within the union rank-and-file. This also assumes that
the skills its members possessed are critical and rare enough that employers are
forced to negotiate with that particular union due to what John Dunlop once called
(1949:179-180) labor's "strategic market position." Moreover, the means for training
workers - trade schools, apprenticeship programs, and the like - must respond
directly to the requirements set by the union so that the number of entrants to the
field, if not at least equal to the number of those retiring, is, nevertheless, under
control.
It is also important to keep in mind Paul Thompson's arguments (1983:96)
that what constitute skills are actually social constructions that rely on strategies to
control recruitment and wages. That is, having "skills" is more a matter of having
social power than having innate abilities. Those who have such power, therefore
have skills; those who don't have such control are closer to being "unskilled." The
logic is circular and self-fulfilling, but at the same time, it points to the critical role
of unions in both representing and defining skilled work through its control over
labor force size and pay.
Conversely, if unions are unable to regulate the size of the work force it
represents, then the subsequent "flood" of non-union workers undermines the
capacity of a union to maintain wages and to provide the services its members
expect. So should there be an over-supply of workers, due to the unregulated
acquisition of skills, problems in professional licensing and authorization, a
"prisoners' dilemma" that ideologically divides the work force, the prying open of
"closed" shops, deskilling and mechanization, the wide-spread extent of skills,
management machinations, and government connivance, then wages could fall. Thus
maintaining a strict monopoly over the supply of workers maintains the wage levels
that workers demand. Unions that can't do this usually aren't around to do the other
things they are expected to do, like negotiating with management, protecting
benefits, and entering the political domain.
It is readily seen, then, that in Egypt, the combined effects of rural-to-urban
migration, the inflation of the informal sector, its personalized hiring practices, and
its paternalistic management style, together with (what will remain undiscussed
here) deskilling, mechanization, short-term business strategies, disfunctional
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schools, and government fear and insecurity have severely undermined the capacity
of formal labor unions to resolve even mild, bread-and-butter issues much less the
more syndicalist goals of political participation.
Currently the government is discussing a new labor law which finally
provides workers with the right to strike in exchange for allowing employers the
right to fire. Management, somewhat correctly, fears unreasonable and unbridled
strike action and so has pressured the state to severely limit these possibilities to the
rarest of circumstances. Labor, somewhat correctly, fears unreasonable and
uncontrolled firings and streamlining, particular when employment alternatives
prove so rare in an economy where the government has failed to attract sufficient
investment and hence job generation. Thus both labor and management still continue
to rely on government. The mediational functions of unions keeps labor-
management negotiations in the realm of the public domain instead of as private
initiatives. Ironically, the invigoration of unions as independent, responsive,
democratic organizations has not even been raised. Nor will it as long as unions
remain unable to fulfill its basic function of maintaining the size of an industry's
work force and thereby fix its wages.
Thus eviscerated, unions currently are mired in the mud of corruption,
influence peddling, illegitimacy, and powerlessness. It would be wrong to suggest
that labor recruitment from the informal sector provides the only obstacle to
strengthening the unions in Egypt since it is only one of the many deterrents
mentioned above. Yet those who have interrogated the history of Egypt's labor
movement (Lockman and Beinin [1987], Goldberg [1986], and Posusney [1997])
often fail to appreciate the breaching of Sabel's segmented labor force for its ability
to undermine organized, formal labor.
For it is the large informal sector that serves as the migrant's first introduction
to the city, that threatens the formal organized work force with those able (and
perhaps willing) to undermine its wage levels, and that weakens the capacity of
unions to therefore do their job. Neglecting this connection between the two has led
to underestimating the importance of the reserve labor army in the informal sector
in explaining the dismal political clout of organized factory workers against the state
(Posusney 1997), the discrepancy between industrial organization and political
consciousness (Goldberg 1986), and the vast gap between rank-and-file workers and
their more educated, middle-class, and secure organizers (Beinin and Lockman
1987).
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KAFR AL-DAWWAR: A SMALL CASE STUDY
Thus an engineered rural poverty has generated a vast outpouring of rural-to-urban
migrants who have expanded the ranks of urban informal sector establishments and
have therefore weakened the performance of Egypt's labor unions. The
repercussions of this chain of events can be illustrated by examining a small case
study of recent labor unrest that took place in Kafr al-Dawwar in 1994.
On September 30, workers employed at the government Egyptian Spinning
and Weaving Company in this northwestern Delta town staged a massive sit-in.
They were protesting management's firing of 2,000 workers over the previous year,
withholding salary adjustments and fringe benefits, reducing job security, and their
union's weakness. New management had recently been appointed to streamline this
and two other factories in anticipation of their privatization. Workers considered the
union local entirely ineffective, and during the strike, they beat up two union
representatives when they refused to convey the workers' demands to the company.
Initially, the strike was peaceful, but on October 1, workers from sister factories in
nearby Mahmudiya and Kum Hamid seized company buses and drove to Kafr to
support the strike. The next morning, the police surrounded both the factory and
adjoining workers' housing, and fighting broke out. For two hours, troops and
workers clashed, one using live ammunition, the other using stones and bottles. Four
civilians were killed, anywhere from 30 to 60 workers were reported wounded, and
75 protesters were arrested. The strike and strife stopped on October 2 when
workers agreed to resume work in exchange for management personnel changes
(Middle East Times [Cairo] October 9-15, 1994).
But such unrest threatened to spread throughout the Delta and to the rest of
Egypt as well. At the same time, four thousand workers at the Nasr Cement
Company in Suez threatened a sit-in to demand their monthly bonuses. In al-
Mahalla al-Kubra, police, fearing more trouble in Egypt's flagship textile factories,
began arresting activists. Workers were claiming that holidays, bonuses, health
benefits, and wages were being withheld, and excessive deductions were being
imposed for minor infractions. Some 600 privately-owned textile factories had
closed over the previous two years. Repression, however, prevented any job action,
and union and political party activists were powerless to stop the government
(Middle East Times [Cairo] November 20-26, 1994).
Meanwhile, in the bureaucratic halls of Cairo, government officials prudently
and quietly raised cost-of-living allowances, boosted bonuses, and gradually
increased basic wages. And shortly thereafter, officials were to create an early
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retirement program that would buy off workers discharged in attempts to reduce
work rolls, increase profits, and attract foreign investors (Ibid.).
Kafr al-Dawwar, however, remains somewhat unique. Towering up from the
surrounding farm fields, it was abruptly created in the 1940s out of nothing and does
not contain the profusion of small enterprises that could receive overflow orders
from the formal sector or absorb workers cast off when factories reduce their
operations. Some workers could switch to firms in nearby Alexandria, but this
meant relocating their entire family. In other industrial towns like al-Mahalla,
Shubra al-Khayma, and Helwan, workers could use their contacts with colleagues
in adjacent workshops to procure new employment. However, the closure of 600
businesses in al-Mahalla may well have jeopardized this possibility, raising pressure
that could only be relieved by violent job action. Reports from Kafr al-Dawwar
indicated that had its workers had alternative employment, their anger over
streamlining would have dissipated. For many realized that their productivity was
severely reduced by the employment expansion in the 1960s and relished finding
sound, productive jobs. But as along as the formal job market remained limited, and
as long as it remained inflated by the surplus army from the informal sector, textile
workers became desperate to keep what they had. Given the pathetic performance
of the labor unions, the only alternatives were protests, strikes, and violence.
CONCLUSION
I'm reminded of a recent group of American scholars visiting Cairo to study its
urban problems. At one point in the discussion I asked whether they were going to
visit village Egypt as well. They smiled and said they hadn't the time. Yet I hope I
have established here the intimate and strong connection between what takes place
in rural agriculture (which is by no means the entire countryside, but is, still,
sizeable), rural-to-urban migration, the expansion of the informal sector, its threat,
potential and real, to formal urban industrial enterprises, and its weakening of
Egypt's labor movement. I'm also reminded of the government attempts in the 1930s
to administer and regulate the countryside that came after cries were raised about
how crowded Cairo had become, how rural migrants were despoiling such a
beautiful city, and that something just had to be done. For unlike the visiting
American scholars, these doomsayers did understand that the roots of Cairo's
problems, and those of the other cities and towns throughout the country, began in
Egypt's 4,0000 villages, radiated outward as wave after wave moved to more
modern places, and succeeded in undermining the efforts of labor, management, and
government to develop both the urban and the national economies.
James Toth,
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